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DUAL-CLASS CAPITAL STRUCTURES:
A LEGAL, THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL
BUY-SIDE ANALYSIS
Christopher C. McKinnon*
“The advantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects en-
trepreneurial management from the demands of ordinary shareholders.
The disadvantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects en-
trepreneurial management from the demands of shareholders.”†
Issuing dual classes of stock has become hotly debated since two major
events transpired in 2014: (1) Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $19 billion
and (2) Alibaba chose to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) instead of the Hong Kong Exchange.  Because dual-class manag-
ers, like those at Facebook and Alibaba, retain a controlling voting block,
their decisions are immune from activist investors or others who disagree
with corporate actions.  This protection allowed Mark Zuckerberg to ac-
quire WhatsApp at an enormous price that stockholders may have resisted,
and it is why Alibaba chose to list on the NYSE even though its stockhold-
ers may have found the Hong Kong Exchange to be a more natural fit.
This Comment seeks to determine whether the one-man decisional struc-
tures at Facebook and Alibaba—accomplished  through dual classes of
stock—allow such managers to undertake, what the market perceives to be,
value-destroying transactions more often than their single-class
counterparts.
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INTRODUCTION
Google, Facebook, and Alibaba are recent examples of high-profile
companies to issue dual classes of stock in their initial public offerings
(IPOs).1  Dual-class ownership structures give company insiders—includ-
ing founders and management—superior voting rights (control) and lower
cash flow rights (financial interest).  Conversely, in such structures, public
investors purchase an inferior class of stock with subordinated voting
rights.  For example, a typical dual-class structure would grant Class A
stock with one vote per share to the public and reserve Class B stock with
10 votes per share for management.2
Starting with Google in 2004, a wave of large technology companies
have utilized dual-class structures to obtain the capital inflows that result
from an IPO while retaining the degree of control that typically exists dur-
ing private venture financing.3  In general, there are relatively few dual-
class companies in the U.S. today: about 6% of public companies maintain
dual-class structures, collectively representing about 8% of total U.S. mar-
ket capitalization.4  However, the recent trend towards utilizing dual-class
structures indicates that over 11% of all companies that underwent IPOs
between January 2010 and March 2012 issued dual classes of stock.5
1. David Shipley, et al., Alibaba IPO is Nothing to Celebrate, BLOOMBERGVIEW
(Mar. 18, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-18/alibaba-s-ipo-
is-nothing-to-celebrate. See also Steve Schaefer, Alibaba Updates IPO Filing, Names Partners
who will Control Company, FORBES (June 16, 2014, 7:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
steveschaefer/2014/06/16/alibaba-updates-ipo-filing-names-partners-who-will-control-com-
pany/ (noting that although Alibaba does not technically have a dual-class capital structure,
its unique 27-member partnership “has the exclusive ability to nominate a majority of direc-
tors of the company, ensuring that it will effectively have control of the board.”).
2. Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in
the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010).
3. Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 884
(1994) (dual-class structures allow “founding entrepreneurs or family members access to the
equity markets without diluting control”); see also Richard Moroney, Not All Shares are Cre-
ated Equal: More Multiclass Stocks to Join Google in the S&P 500, FORBES (July 16, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2014/07/16/not-all-shares-are-created-equal-more-mul-
ticlass-stocks-to-join-google-in-the-sp-500/ (noting that the “dual-class structure has become
popular with the latest wave of technology companies”); see also Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy
S. Thamodaran, Capital Formation: Debating the Pros and Cons of Dual Class Capital Struc-
tures, 27 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2–3 (2013) (explaining that before this wave of
dual-class technology IPOs, these structures traditionally had been “used most frequently
and prominently by media and communications companies . . . . including News Corp., The
New York Times, and The Washington Post”).
4. Gompers, et al., supra note 2, at 1051.
5. Glover & Thamodaran, supra note 3, at 2.
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The sell-side implications of these creative ownership structures are
well documented: management’s increased voting power renders these
firms “virtually immune from hostile takeovers.”6  Dual-class firms also
tend to trade at a discount.7  This Comment does not focus on the sell-side
or general valuation implications of dual-class ownership, as those areas
have been thoroughly explored.  Rather, this piece focuses primarily on
buy-side transactions, or acquisitions.  Acquisitions are extremely impor-
tant to corporate value: they are one of the most expensive investments a
firm makes and they have short- and long-term consequences.8  Such ac-
tions are also ripe opportunities for managers to engage in self-dealing by
undertaking empire-building transactions that yield private benefits of
control but destroy overall shareholder value over the long run.9  In fact,
the majority of empirical literature reveals that acquisitions, on average,
destroy value for shareholders over the long term.10
In this Comment, Parts I and II examine the legal and theoretical con-
cerns regarding dual-class ownership.  Parts III and IV survey and analyze
the relevant empirical studies published on this subject.  Lastly, to contrib-
ute to the literature, Part V provides a unique empirical analysis of the
abnormal returns to recent large-scale acquisitions made by dual- and sin-
gle-class technology companies.  As the recent uptick in dual-class IPOs is
attributable, in part, to the growing technology industry,11 focusing exclu-
sively on that sector is illustrative.  This study sets out to determine
whether dictatorship—exhibited by managers at dual-class technology
companies in buy-side transactions—destroys value for ordinary
shareholders.
6. Gompers, et al., supra note 2, at 1051.
7. See infra Part III.A; see also Ashton, supra note 3, at 868 (explaining that in an
IPO the “value of the vote will be discounted and reflected in the price on which the buyer
and seller have agreed”).
8. Ashrafee T. Hossain, Dual vs. Single Class Firms: An Acquisition Perspective, 14 J.
ACCT. & FIN. 9, 10 (2014).
9. Tian Wen, You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own it Too: Disallowing Dual-Class
Stock Companies From Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1499
(2014) (explaining that “[w]hen voting rights are not proportional to the economic interests
of the shareholders, controllers can easily obtain private benefits while imposing dispropor-
tionate costs on the broader shareholder base.”).
10. See infra note 74.
11. James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012), http://www
.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki (explaining that starting
with Google in 2004, “the [dual-class] arrangement has become popular among technology
companies. All the big tech I.P.O.s of the past year [2011]—LinkedIn, Groupon, Yelp,
Zynga—featured it . . . .”); see also Jeff Green & Ari Levy, Zuckerberg Grip Becomes New
Normal in Silicon Valley, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
05-07/zuckerberg-stock-grip-becomes-new-normal-in-silicon-valley-tech.html (explaining that
“Mark Zuckerberg’s majority control over Facebook . . . has become the new normal in
Silicon Valley as entrepreneurs’ desire to hold sway trumps shareholder power”).
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I. LEGAL REGULATIONS
A. Exchange Rules
Some jurisdictions permit companies to go public with dual classes of
stock while others strictly forbid it.  The main exchanges in the U.S.—
NYSE and NASDAQ—allow companies to go public with differential vot-
ing rights.12  Similarly, exchanges in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden,
and Canada permit companies to issue dual classes of stock.13  Other juris-
dictions in Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, India, Russia, and the U.K. for-
bid the practice.14
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates publi-
cally traded securities.  In 1988, the SEC proposed Rule 19c-4, which pro-
hibited dual-class recapitalizations but permitted dual-class IPOs.  It
barred companies from “nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the
per share voting rights of holders of an outstanding class . . . of common
stock.”15
In 1990, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Rule
19c-4 because it dealt with a matter of corporate governance beyond the
scope of the SEC’s authority.16  Regardless, the NYSE and Nasdaq agreed
to abide by this rule through their internal guidelines.  For example, the
NYSE Listed Company Manual states: “Voting rights of existing share-
holders . . . cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any corpo-
rate action or issuance. Examples of such corporate actions [do not include
new IPOs].”17  Nasdaq has a nearly identical provision.18  Thus, Rule 19c-
4 lives on, being enforced by national exchanges themselves.
B. Fiduciary Duties
Even though high-vote shareholders enjoy increased flexibility in firm
management, their decisions are nevertheless constrained by fiduciary
duty principles.  Two recent cases exemplify these fundamental principles.
First, In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation (2012) illus-
trates that managers at dual-class firms owe fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders in sell-side transactions.  In that case, Delphi maintained dual
12. See infra notes 17, 18.
13. Your IPO Listing Requirements, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKAUS DERINGER, ch.9, 22
(2014), http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/News_Room/Insight/IPO/
35368%20IPO%20listing%20requirementsSpread.pdf.
14. Id.; see also Steven M. Davidoff, In Manchester United’s I.P.O., a Preference for
American Rules, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
07/10/in-manchester-uniteds-i-p-o-a-preference-for-u-s-rules; see also Simon C.Y. Wong,
Google’s Stock-Split Plan Would Replace Stewardship with Dictatorship, HARV. BUS. REV.
BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/04/googles_stocksplit_plan_would.html.
15. Commodity and Securities Exchanges Rules 17 C.F.R. §240.19c-4 (2015).
16. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
17. NYSE Inc., Listed Company Manual §313(A) (2013).
18. NASDAQ, Inc., Stock Market Rules §5640 (2009).
Fall 2015] Dual-Class Capital Structures 85
classes of stock with controlling shareholder, Chairman, and CEO Robert
Rosenkranz (and affiliates) owning 49.9% of the voting power and 12.9%
of the cash flow rights of the company through super-voting stock.19  Del-
phi’s post-IPO charter prohibited disparate consideration between the two
classes of stock in the event of a merger or acquisition.20  In 2011, another
company approached Delphi with a merger bid, which the board of direc-
tors allowed Rosenkranz to negotiate on behalf of the company.21  Ulti-
mately, Rosenkranz approved the merger on the condition that he receive
a control premium ($53.875/share instead of $44.875/share) and that the
company amend the charter to allow disparate consideration.22  The board
had little choice but to approve the proposal.23
Shareholders upset with Rosenkranz’s negotiated premium brought a
lawsuit to block the merger.24  The Delaware Court of Chancery did not
enjoin the transaction because it did not appear the company would re-
ceive a superior offer.25  However, it noted that Rosenkranz likely
breached his fiduciary duties by obtaining a premium in violation of the
charter, which could be remedied through a separate action for damages.26
Shareholders then sued Rosenkranz demanding disgorgement of the pre-
mium he received.  That case recently settled for $49 million – 90% of the
total $55 million premium Rosenkranz obtained.27
Second, as mentioned in the survey of exchange rules above, dual-class
companies cannot reduce the voting power of publically traded shares.
This issue was litigated in In re Google, Inc. Class C Shareholder Litigation
(2012).  When Google went public in 2004, the company maintained dual
classes of stock.28  Over time, Google issued so many shares that founders
Larry Page and Sergey Brin came close to losing control of the company,
19. In re Delphi Fin. Group S’holder Litig., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, *11 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 6, 2012).
20. Id. at *12.
21. Id. at *47 (“[T]he Board used Rosenkranz to negotiate the deal with [bidder] even
after he disclosed his intention to demand additional compensation for his Class B shares as a
condition of his supporting the Merger.”).
22. Id.
23. Id. at *4 (“Although the Delphi board was reluctant to recommend a differential
for the Class B stock, it also recognized that the premium [bidder] was willing to pay over
market was very large, and would probably be attractive to the stockholders.”).
24. Id. at *39.
25. Id. at *7.
26. Id. at *61.
27. Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief in Support of Final Approval of Settlement, Class Certifi-
cation and Application for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at
2, In re Delphi Fin. Group S’holder Litig., 2012 WL3113652 (Del. Ch. 2012) (No. 7144 –
VCG).
28. See Eric Lam & Gerrit De Vynck, Google Inc. Split April 3 Offers Short Window
of Opportunity for the Alert, FIN. POST (March 26, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/
2014/03/26/google-inc-split-april-3-could-offer-short-window-of-opportunity/?__lsa=3753-d7f
8#__federated=1.
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holding just 56% of the company’s votes and 15% of the cash flow rights
through super-voting stock.29  Page and Brin decided to issue a stock divi-
dend of new non-voting Class C stock to all existing (Class A and Class B)
shareholders, effectively accomplishing a two-for-one stock split and re-
capitalization.30  As noted above, Nasdaq (on which Google’s shares
trade) prevents recapitalizations that reduce the voting power of a publi-
cally traded class of stock,31 but the exchange considered this type of
transaction technically permissible because it did not alter the ordinary
shares’ one vote per share mechanism.  The board of directors approved
Page and Brin’s proposal because “[t]he only likely alternative to voting
‘yes’ would have been to resign and explain why [they] voted ‘no.’ Or they
most likely would not have found their names on the board nomination list
next year.”32
Nevertheless, shareholders filed suit to enjoin the transaction, alleging
Page and Brin breached their fiduciary duties.33  Because the new non-
voting shares will likely trade at a discount to existing one-vote shares,
stockholders alleged that management was unlawfully destroying share-
holder value and blatantly engaging in self-dealing and entrenchment.
The case recently settled, with Google agreeing to pay some percentage
(based on a complex formula) of the discount the new non-voting class of
stock receives one year after issuance if it is greater than 1%.34  As of
January 30, 2015, non-voting Class C shares (GOOG) were trading at a
0.56% discount to ordinary one-vote Class A shares (GOOGL), which
would not necessitate any payment from Google.35
These cases illustrate the legal protections afforded to ordinary share-
holders at dual-class firms in sell-side transactions and (effective) recapi-
talizations.  Unlike these rare events, an acquisition is an expected and
routine corporate action.  As such, these transactions are sufficiently pro-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See NASDAQ, supra note 18.
32. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Stock Split for Google that Cements Control at the Top, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2012, 9:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/stock-
split-for-google-that-cements-control-at-the-top; see also Jason M. Leviton, Google, Inc. and
its Proposed Recapitalization: A Case Study of Hidden Threats to Corporate Governance and
Diminution of the Franchise, What You Need to Know to Fulfill Your Duties as Trustee,
BLOCK & LEVITON LLP (May, 2013), http://www.ncpers.org/files/Jason%20Levitan_Wednes
day_South%20Pac%203.pdf (noting that the board approved the transaction despite “more
than 85% of the Class A stockholders vot[ing] against the Recapitalization.”).
33. In re Google, Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 6735045 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 28, 2013).
34. Section 2 (Definitions) and Section 3 (Terms of Settlement) of the Stipulation of
Compromise and Settlement, In re Google, Inc. Class C S’holder Litig. (Oct. 28, 2013), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312513418880/d618226dex991.htm.
35. GOOGL was trading at $537.55 while GOOG was trading at $534.52.
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tected by the business judgment rule, allowing management to accomplish
them with little interference from ordinary shareholders.36
C. Calls for Reform
After losing Alibaba to the NYSE in 2014, the Hong Kong Exchange is
considering lifting its ban on dual-class stock offerings.37  The Hong Kong
Exchange is reluctant to allow the issuance of stock in dual-class compa-
nies because, unlike the U.S., they do not have a class-action litigation
system or increased reporting requirements that supplement exchange
rules.38  The Exchange is currently undecided on whether it will change its
rules, but it was clear that “[l]osing one or two listing candidates [like
Alibaba] is not a big deal for Hong Kong, but losing a generation of com-
panies from China’s new economy is.”39  Singapore is similarly considering
loosening its restriction on dual-class IPOs.40
Although exchanges that forbid dual-class capitalization continue to
consider removing their prohibitions, there have been some calls for the
NYSE and Nasdaq to ban dual-class IPOs by prominent institutions such
as the Council of Institutional Investors, Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices, and CalPERS.41  Exchanges are conflicted about definitively ruling
one way or another, in part, because the economic literature on this topic
is mixed.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY OF DUAL-CLASS OWNERSHIP
The seminal theoretical analysis from Grossman and Hart (1988), con-
curred with by Harris and Raviv (1988), asserts, “[A] one share/one vote
security structure is optimal” in terms of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion42 because it increases the chance that a value-increasing takeover by a
rival would be consummated.43  Activist investors seeking to change cor-
porate direction or methods cannot effectively threaten a proxy contest
36. In the rare event that a shareholder vote is required by law or exchange regula-
tions, dual-class managers maintain a controlling voting block that can push a deal through
despite opposition from a majority of the minority (by voting power) shareholders.
37. Kana Nishizawa & Richard Frost, Hong Kong Seeks Debate on Dual-Class Shares
After Losing Alibaba, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-08-29/hong-kong-seeks-debate-on-dual-class-shares-after-losing-alibaba.
38. Id.
39. Out of Control: More of the World’s Big Stockmarkets are Allowing Firms like




41. Glover & Thamodaran, supra note 3, at 1.
42. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share/One Vote and the Market for
Corporate Control 1, 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2347, 1987).
43. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority
Rules, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 203, 219-27 (1988).
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against a dual-class firm because management retains a controlling voting
block.  Thus, the potential benefits that activist investors could provide are
not available to shareholders at dual-class firms.  Some academics note,
“[D]isproportionate voting common stock is the corporate law equivalent
to price-fixing. It is one of a comparatively few transactions that must be
proscribed in order for a market system to operate effectively.”44
Academics assert that, all else equal, managers will consume more pri-
vate benefits of control at firms where the opportunities to do so are
greater.45  By hindering the market’s efficient functioning, managers at
dual-class firms have the opportunity to waste corporate resources in pur-
suit of private benefits at the expense of overall firm value.46  Professor
Bebchuk also explains that where there is a divergence between voting
and cash flow rights, firms have a strong tendency, all else equal, to ex-
pand rather than contract.47  Unnecessary expansion destroys shareholder
value.48  Thus, as management’s control-to-cash flow divergence becomes
larger, firms are expected to engage in more value-destroying transac-
tions.49  As a consequence, outside shareholders will likely raise the dis-
count on firm valuation.50  Conversely, as voting and cash flow rights
equalize, the incentives of management become more closely aligned with
outside shareholders, leading to better investment decisions for sharehold-
ers and higher valuations overall.51
Managers at dual-class companies are less diversified than ordinary
shareholders, which may incentivize managerial entrenchment and diversi-
fication through inefficient empire-building acquisitions.52  Because high-
vote shareholders bear less of the financial consequences of their decisions
and are less likely to be ousted by dissatisfied shareholders, agency theory
expects managers at dual-class firms to engage in value-destroying acquisi-
tions that increase private benefits of control more frequently than single-
44. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 721 (1986); see also Wen, supra
note 9, at 1497 (noting that “decoupling voting rights from economic ownership is detrimen-
tal to shareholders because it allows companies to avoid the threat of market mechanisms
that have traditionally served to keep management in check. In the long term, this
decoupling is incompatible with principles of corporate governance . . .”).
45. Ronald W. Masulis, et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies 22 (Euro-
pean Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 209/2008, June, 2008).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class
Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights 11
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6951, 1999).
48. J. Ramachandran, et al., Why Conglomerates Thrive (Outside the U.S.), 91 HARV.
BUS. REV. 111, 112 (2013) (noting that in the U.S., corporate “diversification destroys value.
On Wall Street the conglomerate discount ranges from 6% to 12%.”).
49. Masulis, et al., supra note 45, at 3–4.
50. Id. at 1.
51. Bebchuk, et al., supra note 47, at 15.
52. Hossain, supra note 8, at 10.
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class firms.53  However, the illiquid nature of super-voting stock and the
close bond founders have to their companies may also lead them to act in
their companies’ long-term interests.54
Proponents of dual-class structures assert that management’s voting
control enables such a firm to govern with minimal outside interference,
allowing it to focus on sustained business growth and deliver shareholders
higher returns in the long term.55  The economic literature also confirms
that managing for the short term destroys long-term shareholder value in
numerous ways:
First, companies delay or forgo value-creating investments to meet consensus
earnings expectations. [Second,] managers exploit the discretion allowed by
the accounting rules in the calculation of earnings by pushing revenues into
the current period and deferring expenses to future periods.56
One “strategy for eliminating the curse of short-termism is dual-class own-
ership . . . . [It] allows founders to control the company’s future without
depending on what others think.”57
Ultimately, when shareholders invest in a dual-class company, “[they
are] betting on someone whose judgment [they] trust for the long term,”
says Professor Eisenmann of Harvard Business School.58  At Google,
Facebook, and Alibaba, for example, Page and Brin, Zuckerberg, and Jack
Ma control the direction and strategy at their respective companies.59  De-
spite knowing these corporate insiders hold a disproportionate amount of
control, investors purchase stock in dual-class companies, placing their
faith and money in the hands of company founders, believing them to have
superior intelligence and knowledge about the businesses they created.
In 1999, Bebchuk wrote, “Given the magnitude of the potential agency
costs associated with [minority-controlled firms], a second important ques-
tion concerns the actual costs associated with these firms.”60  Numerous




55. INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST. & INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., CON-
TROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND
RISK REVIEW 3 (Oct. 2012), http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Con-
trolled-Company-ISS-Report1.pdf.
56. Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 65, 69 (2005).
57. Malcolm S. Salter, How Short-Termism Invites Corruption . . .And What to Do
About It 20 (Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, Paper No. 5, 2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2247545.
58. John Bussey, The Two-Edged Sword of Dual-Class Shares, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19,
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904292504576484971843643158.
59. See Wen, supra note 9, at 1499 (“When investors buy common stock in a company
with dual-class stock, they are essentially betting on the management of the company to
create value”).
60. Bebchuk, et al., supra note 47, at 28 (emphasis added).
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III. EMPIRICAL EFFECTS ON FIRM VALUE
A. Value Destroying
The majority of empirical studies on this topic indicate that dual-class
structures decrease firm value.  Mikkelson and Partch (1994) studied dual-
class recapitalizations between 1976–1987.61  They found that changing to
a dual-class structure significantly decreases operating income, which is a
“consequence of unbundling managers’ ownership of equity claims and
control of votes.”62  In addition, Claessens et al. (2002) conducted an in-
ternational analysis of companies where ownership is separated from con-
trol.63  They found that as the wedge between control and cash flow rights
increases, firm valuation decreases, which is likely due to the positive in-
centive effects of cash flow rights.64  Another prominent study by
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) confirms that firm value is negatively
associated with insiders’ level of voting rights and negatively associated
with the degree of separation between voting and cash flow rights—both
at economically and statistically significant levels.65
More recently, Investor Responsibility and Research Center (IRRC)
and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) compared stock returns at
dual- and single-class companies between 2002–2012.66  Contrary to the
theoretical argument that dual-class firms may perform less well in the
short term but reap higher long-term returns, in reality single-class firms
outperformed dual-class firms over three-, five-, and ten-year timeframes
while dual-class companies performed better only over a short-term, one-
year timeframe—turning the conventional theory on its head.67
B. Value Creating
Some prominent academics have asserted that dual-class structures do
not harm shareholder value.  Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that alternate
monitoring systems act to disincentive managerial self-dealing at firms
where ownership is separated from control.68  In addition, DeAngelo and
DeAngelo (1985) claim that if dual-class structures are inefficient organi-
zational forms, one would expect their usage to decline over time as their
61. Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Consequences of Unbundling Man-
agers’ Voting Rights and Equity Claims, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 175, 181 (1994).
62. Id. at 198.
63. Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of
Large Shareholdings, J. FIN. 2741, 2743 (2002).
64. See id. at 2764.
65. Gompers, et al., supra note 2, at 1054, 1084.
66. INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST. & INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. supra note
55, at 3.
67. See id.
68. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.
L. & ECON. 301(1983).
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deficiencies become more apparent, which has not occurred.69  These pa-
pers are primarily theoretical, however, and do not provide statistical data
or analysis to support their assertions.
Two studies have empirically found that dual-class ownership increases
firm value.  Boehmer, Sanger and Varshney (1996) review a sample of
dual-class IPOs and recapitalizations between 1985–1988.70  The results
are mixed, revealing that companies going public with dual-class structures
outperform their matched single-class counterparts in terms of stock re-
turns and accounting performance but recapitalizing to a dual-class struc-
ture decreases firm value.71  The authors favor their IPO data, and
conclude, “[B]y holding superior-voting shares without access to a liquid
secondary market, [dual-class managers] commit[ ] to a long-term involve-
ment with the firm.”72  In another study by Dimitrov and Jain (2006), the
authors analyze dual-class recapitalizations from 1979–1998, finding that
following the announcement of a dual-class recapitalization, companies
experience “positive abnormal returns.”73
IV. BUY-SIDE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Value Destroying
While some conflicting evidence exists regarding whether dual-class
structures increase or decrease firm value on the whole, the analysis spe-
cifically pertaining to corporate acquisitions is more uniform but also more
limited. Acquirers, on average, overpay for target companies.74  Moreo-
ver, recent studies indicate that losses to acquirer returns are more signifi-
cant for dual-class firms compared to single-class firms.
Acquisition decisions are particularly relevant to dual-class agency
problems because they tend to be among the firm’s most significant invest-
69. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights: A
Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 53
(1985).
70. Ekkehart Boehmer, et al., Managerial Bonding and Stock Liquidity: An Analysis
of Dual-Class Firms, 28 J. ECON. & FIN. 117, 117 (2004).
71. Id. at 117–18, 126.
72. Id. at 129.
73. Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common
Stock into Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 342, 347-50
(2006).
74. See Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer
Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018, 1028–29 (2012) (“[M]any, although clearly
not all, acquisitions destroy value for long-term acquirer shareholders.  This is particularly
true in the case of takeovers of publicly traded targets by publicly traded acquirers.”); see
also Anup Agrawal, et al., The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-Examina-
tion of an Anomaly, 47 J. FIN. 1605, 1606 (1992) (“[S]tockholders of acquiring firms experi-
ence a statistically significant wealth loss of about 10% over five years after the merger
completion date.”); Sara B. Moeller, et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study
of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN.  757, 757 (2005) (finding that
from 1998–2001, acquirer shareholders lost 12 cents for every dollar spent on acquisitions).
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ments, which can lead to heightened conflicts of interest and significant
discounts on firm valuation immediately following an acquisition an-
nouncement.75  Analyzing the market’s reaction around the announce-
ment date is a critical test to determine whether investors believe
management is pursuing a value-generating or value-destroying transac-
tion.76  If shareholders disapprove of a particular acquisition, they will
likely express their dissatisfaction by pushing down stock price.77  Event-
driven studies around acquisition announcements often compute the cu-
mulative abnormal return (CAR) to reveal the market’s reaction to such
events.
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2008) examine how the separation of voting
and cash flow rights affects returns around acquisition announcements us-
ing CAR analysis.78  Their sample is expansive, consisting of U.S. public
company acquisitions for over $1 million and greater than 1% of the ac-
quirer’s market value between 1994–2002.79  Masulis et al. calculate CARs
on a five-day scale (-2, +2 from the announcement with t=0 being the an-
nouncement date).80  A regression analysis revealed that as the divergence
between voting rights and cash flow rights widens by one standard devia-
tion, acquirers experience 1.037% greater negative announcement period
abnormal stock returns.81  The authors conclude, “[T]he market perceives
managers with more voting rights relative to cash flow rights, on average,
make worse acquisition decisions for shareholders.”82
In response to negative reactions from shareholders, single-class com-
panies more readily withdraw proposed acquisitions.83  Because managers
at dual-class firms are less likely to be ousted by dissatisfied shareholders,
they are less likely to forego a proposed transaction due to an unfavorable
market reaction.84  Masulis et al. analyze acquisition withdrawals for sin-
gle-class companies, and their analysis “suggests that the more negatively
the market reacts to the announcement of an acquisition, the more likely
the acquisition is to be withdrawn.”85  Conversely, dual-class “firms . . . are
75. Masulis, et al., supra note 45, at 3.
76. Hans Caspar von der Crone & Evgeny Plasken, The Value of Dual-Class Shares in
Switzerland 22 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Zurich), http:/
/.rwi.uzh.ch/////_of_Dual-Class_Shares.pdf.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Masulis, et al., supra note 45, at 1.
79. Id. at 12–13.  Specifically, the authors found 410 dual-class acquisitions meeting
these criteria during that period; they then found a matching sample of 410 single-class acqui-
sitions with which to compare results. Id. at 13, 41.
80. Id. at 13.
81. See id. at 14, 19.
82. See id. at 3.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 15.
85. Id. at 16.
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less responsive to the market’s assessment of an acquisition’s merits and
are more likely to carry through deals that destroy shareholder value.”86
Hossain (2014) confirms Masulis et al.’s findings on a larger sample
between 1996-2009, evaluating 12,404 transactions.87  He finds that dual-
class stock returns underperform their single-class counterparts around ac-
quisition announcements.88  The five-day CAR(-2,+2) values reveal that
dual-class acquisitions generate 1.24% lower returns than single-class ac-
quisitions, with a mean dual-class CAR(-2,+2) of 0.58% and a mean single-
class CAR(-2,+2) of 1.82%.89
A similar market response has been found in other countries as well.90
Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) study 280 Italian acquisitions between 1989-
1996.91  They find that a “worse market reaction characterizes acquiring
firms where separation from ownership and control is higher.”92
B. Value Creating
Contrary findings have been found in Switzerland, where dual-class
ownership is more widespread: more than 20% of public firms utilize dual-
class structures there.93  Using a Swiss sample of 145 firms between 2006-
2008,94 Crone and Plasken (2010) find that, on average, dual-class acquisi-
tions result in greater abnormal returns than single-class acquisitions.95
From their data, however, it is clear that single-class firms outperformed
dual-class firms regarding acquisition decisions between 1994-2005.96
Adhikari (2014) similarly finds that dual-class stocks outperform sin-
gle-class stocks around acquisition announcements—but he does so using
a U.S. sample.97  The author analyzes acquisitions accomplished within
one year of going public by dual- and single-class companies between
1980-2008.98  Using this unique sample, the author finds that dual-class
acquirers have significantly higher returns, suggesting that newly public
86. Id.
87. Hossain, supra note 8, at 10-11.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 14-15.
90. Comparability in international studies may be limited by differences in legal merg-
ers and acquisitions regimes.
91. Marco Bigelli & Stefano Mengoli, Sub-Optimal Acquisition Decisions under a Ma-
jority Shareholder System, 8 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 373, 380 (2004).
92. Id. at 377.
93. Crone & Plasken, supra note 76, at 4 (noting that dual-class firms accounted for
“almost a half of all firms listed in Switzerland in the early 1990s and still account for about a
fifth of firms on the market”).
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 27, 31.
96. Id. at 37.
97. Hari Adhikari, The Power of Control: The Acquisition Decisions of Newly Public
Dual-Class Firms 25-27 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
98. Id. at 25.
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dual-class firms make better acquisition decisions than new single-class
firms.99  Explaining this phenomenon, Adhikari observes that dual-class
firms in their first year are more likely to acquire “innovative” targets,
defined as those in an industry within the top one-third of citations per
patent of four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) labeled com-
panies (this includes the technology sector).100  Of those companies that
made an acquisition within one year of going public, dual-class companies
targeted innovative firms on 60.87% of transactions compared to just
52.68% of single-class acquirers.101
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LARGE TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS
A. Sample & Methodology
Because technology companies are responsible for the recent popular-
ity of dual-class ownership among U.S. public companies,102 this study ex-
amines technology acquisitions between 2006-2014.  Further restricting the
sample, only large-scale acquisitions valued over one billion dollars are
considered.  In this space, there have been seventeen large technology
company acquisitions.  This study evaluates those seventeen acquisitions,
of which dual-class firms accomplished five and single-class firms accom-
plished twelve.103
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id. at 26.
101. Id.
102. See Surowiecki, supra note 11; see also Green & Levy, supra note 11.
103.
(No.) Acquirer/Target (Price, Announcement Date):
Dual Class Acquisitions—
(1) Facebook/WhatsApp ($19.00B, 2/19/14)
(2) Google/YouTube ($1.65B, 10/9/06)
(3) Google/DoubleClick ($3.10B, 4/13/07)
(4) Google/Motorola Mobility ($12.50B, 8/15/11)
(5) Google/Nest ($3.20B, 1/13/14)
Single Class Acquisitions—
(1) Oracle/Hyperion ($3.30B, 3/1/07)
(2) Oracle/BEA Syst. ($8.50B, 1/16/08)
(3) Oracle/Sun Microsystems ($7.40B, 4/20/09)
(4) Microsoft/aQuantive ($6.90B, 5/18/07)
(5) Microsoft/Skype ($8.50B, 5/10/11)
(6) Microsoft/Nokia Mobile Phones Unit ($7.20B, 9/3/13)
(7) IBM/Cognos ($5.00B, 11/12/07)
(8) Hewlett-Packard/Mercury ($4.50B, 7/25/06)
(9) Hewlett-Packard/Electronic Data Syst. ($13.90B, 5/13/08)
(10) Hewlett-Packard/Autonomy ($11.70B, 8/18/11)
(11) eBay/GSI Commerce ($2.40B, 3/28/11)
(12) Yahoo/Tumblr ($1.10B, 5/20/13)
Facebook to Acquire WhatsApp, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/news/
2014/02/facebook-to-acquire-whatsapp/(last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Google to Acquire You-
Tube for $1.65 Billion in Stock, GOOGLE, http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2006/10/google-to-
acquire-youtube-for-165_09.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Google to Acquire
DoubleClick, GOOGLE, http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2007/04/google-to-acquire-double
click_13.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility, GOOGLE,
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Like the studies referenced above, abnormal returns are calculated
based on market residuals using the market return model.104  The Stan-
dard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) is used as a proxy for expected re-
turns.105  Expected returns are compared with acquirers’ actual returns
along five-day (CAR-2,+2), twenty-one-day (CAR-10,+10), and sixty-one-day
(CAR-30,+30) windows around the event dates.  An acquirer’s press release
date for an acquisition is used as the event date (t=0).  The difference in
the daily percentage change between an acquirer’s opening and closing
price and the market’s opening and closing price are then aggregated to
yield the five-, twenty-one-, and sixty-one-day CAR values for each acqui-
sition during the relevant period.106
B. Results
For this sample of acquisitions, the mean CAR values for dual-class
and single-class companies around acquisition announcements are as
follows:
https://investor.google.com/releases/2011/0815.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Google to
Acquire Nest, GOOGLE, https://investor.google.com/releases/2014/0113.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2015); Oracle Buys Enterprise Performance Management Leader Hyperion, ORACLE,
http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/press/015972_EN (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); Oracle to
Acquire BEA Systems, ORACLE, http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/press/015835_EN (last
visited Sept. 20, 2015); Oracle Buys Sun, ORACLE, http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/press/
(last visited Sept. 20, 2015); Microsoft to Acquire aQuantive, Inc., MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER,
https://news.microsoft.com/2007/05/18/microsoft-to-acquire-aquantive-inc/(last visited Sept.
20, 2015); Microsoft to Acquire Skype, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, https://news.microsoft
.com/2011/05/10/microsoft-to-acquire-skype/(last visited Sept. 20, 2015); Microsoft to Acquire
Nokia’s Devices & Services Business, License Nokia’s Patents and Mapping Services,
MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, https://news.microsoft.com/2013/09/03/microsoft-to-acquire-noki
as-devices-services-business-license-nokias-patents-and-mapping-services/ (last visited Sept.
20, 2015); IBM to Acquire Cognos to Accelerate Information on Demand Business Initiative,
IBM, https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/22572.wss (last visited Sept. 20, 2015);
HP to Acquire Mercury Interactive Corp., HP, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-re-
lease.html?id=169236#.Vf7RDlbZqhY (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); HP to Acquire EDS for
$13.9 Billion, HP, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=169924#.Vf7RV
VbZqhY (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); HP to Acquire Leading Enterprise Information Man-
agement Software Company Autonomy Corporation plc, HP, http://www8.hp.com/uk/en/hp-
news/press-release.html?id=1051736 (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); eBay Inc. to Acquire GSI
Commerce, EBAY, http://investor.ebay.com/common/mobile/iphone/releasedetail.cfm?Re
leaseID=560205&CompanyID=ebay&mobileid= (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); Yahoo! to Ac-
quire Tumblr, YAHOO, https://investor.yahoo.net/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=765892 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2015).
104. See Event Study Methodology: Abnormal Returns, EVENT STUDIES METRICS, http:/
/eventstudymetrics.com/index.php/event-study-methodology/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
105. All acquirers in this sample are in the Standard & Poor’s 500. Standard & Poor’s
500 SPX, CBOE, http://www.cboe.com/products/snp500.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
106. Bigelli & Mengoli, supra note 91, at 386 (“The narrow window [(CAR-2,+2)] should
capture the information revealed by the public announcement, while the wide window
[(CAR-30,+30)] should capture any outflow of information that occurred in the 30 days before
and after the announcement date.”).  The 21-day (CAR-10,+10) window is included as an inter-
mediate point of reference.
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TABLE 1.  MEAN CAR VALUES
CAR(-2,+2) CAR(-10,+10) CAR(-30,+30)
Dual Class Mean 0.15% 0.05% -5.10%
Single Class Mean 0.10% 1.46% 3.08%
Dual-class acquisitions generate slightly higher—though statistically in-
significant—short-term returns relative to single-class acquisitions over
the five-day window but single-class firms noticeably outperform dual-
class firms over the longer-term twenty-one-day and sixty-one-day win-
dows.107  The CAR values collectively reveal a general trend that dual-
class stock returns decline as the event window expands while single-class
stock returns increase as the window expands.
FIGURE 1.  SAMPLE RESULTS, LINEAR GRAPH
107. There are two significant critiques worth noting.  First, only two dual-class compa-
nies satisfied the criteria of this study.  The results may be reflective of the fact that qualifying
single-class technology companies make better acquisitions than Facebook and Google,
rather than the entire population of dual-class technology companies.
Second, the narrow timeframes used (ranging from 5 to 61 days) are too short to reflect
long-term value.  Generally, studies only look to the 5-day CAR values but some extend their
analysis over 61 days.  Acquisitions surely represent long-term growth prospects that cannot
be sufficiently encapsulated by such short-term analysis.  These relatively short timeframes,
though, reflect the market’s perception of those long-term prospects of an announced acqui-
sition.  Tracking stock price changes over longer periods is often not helpful because of nu-
merous intervening events (both company-specific and market-wide) that affect stock prices.
If there is a difference between the short-term market reaction and the long-term growth
prospects, the difference may be reflective of the market’s inability to accurately project
long-term earnings.  For example, Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp generated -11.34%
abnormal returns for CAR(-30,+30) but some have claimed that acquisition has the potential to
be value generating a year later. See Josh Constine, A Year Later, $19 Billion for WhatsApp
Doesn’t Sound so Crazy, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/19/
crazy-like-a-facebook-fox/ (noting that Facebook’s position in the messaging market is now
well solidified, and “[m]ore risky than Facebook not buying WhatsApp was what would hap-
pen if a competitor did. . . . [w]ithout it, Google has seemingly surrendered in the messaging
war.”).
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The mean returns for CAR(-30,+30) reveal the largest disparity between
the two groups and also the greatest spread for all five-number summary
statistics.
FIGURE 2.  BOX PLOT & SUMMARY STATISTICS, CAR(-30,+30)
The difference between dual-class and single-class stock returns is not sta-
tistically significant for CAR(-2,+2) or CAR(-10,+10).  The values for CAR(-30,+30)
are significant at a 0.1 level of significance (90% confidence) for a two-
tailed hypothesis test.108  The statistical analysis suggests that the values
for CAR(-30,+30) would occur by chance 5.34% of the time.  The statistical
standard (although by no means a hard rule) is to reject the null hypothe-
sis (that there is no difference between dual- and single-class stock re-
turns) and claim statistical significance once that chance is equal to or
below 5.00%.  Therefore, these findings do show considerable statistical
significance but it cannot be said with unequivocal certainty that the dif-
ference between dual-class and single-class stock returns did not occur by
random chance.
CONCLUSION
The significantly higher returns to large technology acquisitions accom-
plished by single-class firms relative to dual-class firms reveal that single-
class companies in this industry make better large-scale acquisition deci-
sions for shareholders.  Returns are lower for dual-class firms because
managers with superior voting rights are willing and able to acquire riskier
targets, which can destroy value for ordinary shareholders.  In this analy-
sis, value is measured in terms of market price, revealing only the returns
to public shareholders and not the private benefits to high-vote sharehold-
ers.  It would be rational for managers at dual-class firms to undertake
acquisitions that decrease firm value only when the private benefits of
control outweigh the loss to the firms’ overall market capitalization.  This
misalignment of incentives appears to manifest itself in this sample of
large technology company acquisitions.
108. Due to the small sample size, the central limit theorem does not necessarily apply.
The statistical analysis assumes the population percentage change in returns for both groups
(dual-class and single-class companies) are normally distributed.  The values for CAR(-30,+30)
are significant with 90% confidence, p-value of 0.0534.
